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CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-FEDERAL ABSTENTION HELD IM-
PROPER WHERE CRIMINAL PROSECUTION IS THREATENED
UNDER STATE SUBVERSIVE ACTIVITIEs STATUTE TO DISCOuRAGE
PLAINTIFFS FROM CONTINUING CIVIL RIGHTS ACrIVTIES. Dom-
browski v. Pfister (U.S. 1965).
The plaintiffs, a civil rights organization1 and individuals2 active
in civil rights in the South, filed a complaint in federal district court
invoking the Civil Rights Act3 and seeking declaratory relief and an
injunction restraining defendants4 from prosecuting or threatening
to prosecute5 plaintiffs for alleged violation of two Louisiana sub-
versive activities statutes." The complaint alleged that the statutes
were unconstitutional on their face, because of vagueness and over-
breadth; 7 and as applied, because any possible valid interpretation
would not include the plaintiffs' activities.3 A three-judge district
1 The organization was the Southern Conference Educational Fund, Inc. (SCEF).
2 The individuals were Dombrowski, the executive director of SCEF, who was joined
by intervenor Smith, the treasurer for SCEF, and intervenor Waltzer, an attorney for
SCEF.
8 Specifically the plaintiffs rely on Ray. STAT. § 1979 (1875), 42 U.S.C. § 1983
(1964) which provides: "Every person who, under color of any statute,... subjects or
causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person within the juris-
diction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the
Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in
equity, or other proper proceeding for redress." In this case the plaintiffs alleged that
their rights to free speech as guaranteed under the first amendment were being abridged
and that the application of the statutes to them was not being made in good faith but
was part of a plan to harass them and discourage their protected activities. If true the
allegations would bring the defendants within the proscriptions of § 1983.
4 The defendants were the Governor, police and law enforcement officials, and the
Chairman of the Legislative Joint Committee on Un-American Activities in Louisiana.
5 At the time the complaint was filed the individual plaintiffs had been arrested,
their homes and offices searched at gunpoint, and their records and files seized, thus
effectively crippling the operation of SCEF. A Louisiana judge had ordered the arrests
quashed as not based on probable cause and declared the evidence illegally seized.
Nevertheless, the defendants had continued to threaten prosecution of the plaintiffs.
6 Subversive Activities and Communist Control Law, LA. REv. STAT. ANN. § 14:358 .
74 (Supp. 1964); Communist Propaganda Control law, LA. Rlv. STAT. ANN. § 14:390-
90.8 (Supp. 1964).
7 The vagueness doctrine is basically a due process argument and the Supreme Court
has stated the test as follows: "The test is whether the language conveys sufficiently
definite warning as to the proscribed conduct when measured by common understanding
and practices." Jordon v. De George, 341 U.S. 223, 231-32 (1951).
8 The application argument charges a misapplication of a possibly otherwise con-
stitutional statute. It alleges that even though possible valid constructions are found
for a statute, it is impossible to include the plaintiff's activities within these construc-
tions. In this case the plaintiffs are also alleging that the misapplication is a violation
of the Civil Rights Act, see statute cited note 3 supra.
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court' dismissed the complaint for failure to state a claim upon which
relief could be granted.10
The Supreme Court granted certiorari "to settle important ques-
tions concerning federal injunctions against state criminal prosecu-
tions threatening protected expression."'1 In reversing,'" the Court
held that: (1) the complaint alleged sufficient irreparable injury to
justify equitable relief; 3 (2) it was improper for the district court
to abstain pending state court interpretation of the statutes since "the
abstention doctrine is inappropriate for cases such as the present one
where... statutes are justifiably attacked on their face as abridging
free expression, or as applied for the purpose of discouraging pro-
tected activities";14 (3) the statute proscribing participation in the
formation, management or support of any subversive organization
was invalid because it was unconstitutionally vague and uncertain;'15
9 The three-judge district court was convened pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2281, which
provides: "An interlocutory or permanent injunction restraining the enforcement, opera-
tion or execution of any State statute by restraining the action of any officer of such
State in the enforcement or execution of such statute or of an order made by an ad-
ministrative board or commission acting under State statutes, shall not be granted by
any district court or judge thereof upon the ground of the unconstitutionality of such
statute unless the application therefore is heard and determined by a district court of
three judges convened under section 2284 of this title."
10 Dombrowski v. Pfister, 227 F. Supp. 556 (E.D. La. 1964).
11 Dombrowski v. Pfister, 380 U.S. 479, 483 (1965).
12 Before considering the other issues in the case, the Court discussed the problem
of federal jurisdiction to hear the case. 28 U.S.C. § 2283 provides that: "A court of
the United States may not grant an injunction to stay proceedings in a State court except
as expressly authorized by Congress, or where necessary in aid of its jurisdiction, or to
protect or effectuate its judgments." (Emphasis added.) The Court found that at the
time of the filing of the original complaint by plaintiffs in federal court, no state pro-
ceedings were pending within the meaning of § 2283, citing Ex Parte Young, 209 U.S.
123 (1908) ; Warren, Federal and State Court Interference, 43 HARv. L. REv. 345, 366-
78, (1930); and Note, Federal Power to Enjoin State Court Proceedings, 74 HAv. L.
REV. 726, 728-29 (1961). The Court concluded that state grand jury indictments,
issued against the plaintiffs after the federal court had dismissed the plaintiffs' com-
plaint, were not proceedings within the meaning of the act because the indictment had
been issued only because of the federal court's error in dismissing. Having reached this
conclusion the Court found it was unnecessary to decide whether the Civil Rights Act
constituted an expressly authorized exception to § 2283, thus requiring that plaintiffs'
case be heard based upon the allegations under the Civil Rights Act. 380 U.S. at 484.
Is The Court found that the facts surrounding the arrests, searches and seizures, and
the threatened prosecutions were dearly sufficient to show the "chilling effect on free
expression" which resulted. 380 U.S. at 487. The Court also concluded that the allega-
tions in the complaint depicted a situation where the defense of the criminal prosecution
would not adequately protect the rights of the plaintiffs. This was based on the view
that it was the prosecution and its incidents that were the alleged wrong, not the pos-
sible end result of the prosecution.
14 Id. at 489-90.
15 The definition of subversive organization was found to be "substantially identical
to that of the Washington statute which we considered in Baggett v. Bullitt. . . . We
held that the definition. . . was unduly vague, uncertain and broad." 380 U.S. at 493-94.
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(4) the statute creating an offense of failure to register as a member
of a Communist-front organization was unconstitutional on its face
as resting on an invalid statutory presumption;' and (5) the com-
plaint alleging that state officers invoked and threatened to invoke
criminal process without any hope of ultimate success, but only to
discourage plaintiffs' civil rights activities, stated a claim under the
Civil Rights Act.17 Dombrowski v. Pfister, 390 U.S. 479 (1965).
The Dombrowski decision constitutes a major reevaluation of the
abstention doctrine as applied to the enjoining of state criminal
prosecutions. The doctrine of abstention requires a federal court with
jurisdiction over a case involving state and federal issues to postpone
a hearing on the federal issues and first allow the state courts to
determine the issues of state law. Thus, where a litigant raises a
federal constitutional issue in a case involving state issues as well,
the federal court may avoid an immediate decision by abstaining
and allowing the state courts to act first. The rationale for the doc-
trine combines the reluctance of the Supreme Court to decide a con-
stitutional question unless it is absolutely required to do so, with
the policy of allotting the state courts a proper place in our federal
system.18 The leading abstention case is Railroad Comm'r of Texas
v. Pullman Co.'9 In Pullman the Court was faced with an order of
a state railroad commission requiring white conductors to replace
colored porters in charge of Pullman cars. The Court found that
"The complaint of the Pullman porters undoubtedly tendered a
substantial constitutional issue."20 However, it refused to decide the
16 The statute provided that the fact that an organization was "officially cited or
identified by the Attorney General of the United States . . . or any committee or sub-
committee of the United States Congress as a . . . communist front organization . . .
shall be considered presumptive evidence of the factual status of any such organization"
and the Court found that this statute failed to comply with "procedural safeguards
demanded" by Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee Comm. v. McGrath, 341 U.S. 123 (1951), a
prior decision on the same issue. 380 U.S. at 495.
17 See note 44 infra. The Court also held that the record in the case of LA. Rnv.
STAT. ANN. § 14:390-90.8 (Supp. 1964), was insufficient to allow a decision on the
merits. The Court indicated that the ruling on this statute should await a determination
by the district court of the sufficiency of the threats to enforce the law.
18 One writer has recognized four separate conditions under which abstention is
practiced. They are: "(1) to avoid decision of a federal constitutional question where
the case may be disposed of on questions of state law; (2) to avoid needless conflict
with the administration by a state of its own affairs; (3) to leave to the states the
resolution of unsettled questions of state law; and (4) to ease the congestion on the
federal court docket." WIGHr, FEDER. CouRTs § 52, at 169 (1963). It should be
noted that Wright indicated that the fourth condition is not recognized by the Supreme
Court. The other three are essentially based on the concept of federalism.
L9 312 U.S. 496 (1941).
20 Id. at 498.
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case because there was a serious question as to the authority of the
commission to issue the order under the state law. The Court held:
The law of Texas appears to furnish easy and ample means for
determining the Commission's authority... In the absence of any
showing that these obvious methods for securing a definitive ruling
in the state courts cannot be pursued with full protection of the
constitutional claim, the district court should exercise its wise dis-
cretion by staying its hands.21
The Court remanded the case, instructing the district court to retain
jurisdiction pending the determination of the state issues in the state
courts. In Pullman, though the federal court deferred to the state
court, it should be noted that there was no showing by the plaintiffs
that the constitutional claim could not be adequately protected in
the state court.
In subsequent cases the Supreme Court has held abstention to be
applicable in a variety of different fact situations, but the cases have
not involved situations where threats of immediate prosecution under
criminal statutes were present.2 2 The delay23 and cost to the parties
resulting from federal abstention have been recognized but are gen-
erally justified by a strong policy argument in favor of the traditional
comity doctrine under which federal courts have declined to inter-
fere with state judicial proceedings. 24 Generally, where injunctions
to restrain criminal prosecutions have been sought, the Supreme
Court has not relied on abstention. Rather, in cases where relief has
been denied, the Court has based its decision on the absence of a
clear showing of immediate irreparable injury.3 In addition, the
21 Id. at 501.
22 See Government & Civic Employees Organizing Comm. v. Windsor, 353 U.S. 364
(1957); Albertson v. Millard, 345 U.S. 242 (1953); Shipman v. Du Pre, 339 U.S. 321
(1950) ; AFL v. Watson, 327 U.S. 582 (1946); Spector Motor Serv., Inc. v. Mc-
Laughlin, 323 U.S. 101 (1944); Berford v. Sun Oil Co., 319 U.S. 315 (1943); City
of Chicago v. Fieldcrest Dairies, 316 U.S. 168 (1942). In all these cases abstention was
declared proper but in none of them was there a present threat of immediate enforce-
ment of a state criminal statute.
23 An example of this is the litigation required to decide the merits of Spector Motor
Serv., Inc. v. McLaughlin, supra note 22. WRIGHT, Op. cit. supra note 18, § 52 at 171,
points out that "nine years of litigation in five different courts was required before the
case was finally determined on the merits." At the time the Supreme Court originally
decided the Spector case it appeared to be an excellent one for abstention since the state
taxing statute involved was obviously not clear.
24 See WRIGHT, op. cit. supra note 18, § 52; contra, Clark, Federal Procedural Re-
form & States' Rights, 40 TEXAs L. Rv. 211, 222-25 (1961).
25 See Douglas v. City of Jeannette, 319 U.S. 157 (1943) ; Watson v. Buck, 313
U.S. 387 (1941); Beal v. Missouri Pac. R.R. Corp., 312 U.S. 45 (1940). These cases
all emphasized the absence of a clear showing of immediate irreparable injury and
refused to enjoin state criminal prosecutions.
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Court has found that the normal incidents of a prosecution will not
constitute the necessary irreparable injury. Though it is clear that
this ruling effectively requires adjudication in the state courts, as does
abstention, the basis of the holding is different. Rather than defer-
ence to state courts, the inappropriateness of the injunctive remedy
is the basis of the decision. Thus, in Douglas v. City of Jeannette
26
the Court stated:
It is a familiar rule that courts of equity do not ordinarily restrain
criminal prosecutions. No person is immune from prosecution in
good faith for his alleged criminal acts. Its imminence, even though
alleged to be in violation of constitutional guaranties, is not a
ground for equity relief since the lawfulness or constitutionality of
the statute or ordinance on which the prosecution is based may be
determined as readily in the criminal case as in a suit for an in-
junction.2 7
In holding that injunctive relief was improper the Court stated "we
cannot say the declared intention to institute other proceedings is
sufficient to establish irreparable injury in the circumstances of this
case."
28
However, in Harrison v. NAACP,29 the Court did apply absten-
tion where an injunction restraining criminal prosecutions was
sought. There the plaintiffs sought declaratory relief and an injunc-
tion in a federal court to restrain enforcement of five Virginia
statutes which were designed to thwart the NAACP in its efforts to
aid Negroes to secure their constitutional rights.80 The plaintiffs'
complaint was based partially on the Civil Rights Act.81 The district
court found that three of the statutes were dear, requiring no inter-
pretation by state courts, and declared them unconstitutional. The
Court rejected an argument urging the federal court to refrain from
enjoining a state criminal prosecution and stated, "however, it is
also well recognized that a criminal prosecution may be enjoined
under exceptional circumstances where there is a clear showing of
danger of immediate irreparable injury. . . .It is obvious that the
present case falls in .. . [that] category."82 The Supreme Court
26 Supra note 25.
27 Id. at 163.
28 Id. at 164.
29 360 U.S. 167 (1959).
80 The district court found that the statutes were "enacted for the express purpose of
impeding the integration of the races in the public schools.. ." of Virginia. NAACP v.
Patty, 159 F. Supp. 503, 511 (E.D. Va. 1958).
81 42 U.S.C. § 1981, 1983, see statute cited note 6 supra.
02 NAACP v. Patty, 159 F. Supp. at 521.
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reversed, however, and ordered the lower court to abstain from
ruling on the statutes because there were unresolved issues of state
law involved. Significantly, the Court affirmed the finding of the
presence of irreparable injury but determined that it could be avoided
by an agreement between the parties not to prosecute the plaintiffs
pending the determination of the state issues in a state court.3 The
Court ignored the fact that the plaintiffs' allegations brought the
case within the Civil Rights Act. Thus, Harrison extended the appli-
cation of the doctrine to include two areas: first, claims alleging a
violation of the Civil Rights Act; second, cases seeking to enjoin
state criminal prosecutions where irreparable harm was present.
The dissenting opinion in Harrison concentrated on the effect
which the provisions of the Civil Rights Act should have on the
abstention doctrine. Mr. Justice Douglas writing for three members
of the Court stated:
It seems to me that it was the District Court's duty to provide this
remedy, if the appellees, who invoked that Court's jurisdiction under
the Civil Rights Act, proved their charge that appellants, under the
color of the Virginia statute had deprived them of civil rights
secured by the federal constitution.34
The dissent also noted that the state policy reflected in the statutes
was clearly opposite to the federal law and stated: "we need not-
we should not-give deference to a state policy which seeks to under-
mine paramount federal law. We fail to perform the duty expressly
enjoined by congress on the federal judiciary in the Civil Rights Act
when we do so."s
At this point the doctrine had in effect become an inflexible rule
which required federal courts to abstain if the state courts either
could limit the statute in question to make it constitutional or could
declare the statute void. Cases subsequent to Harrison indicate a
reevaluation by the Supreme Court regarding the desirability of such
an inflexible abstention rule.
Griffin v. County School Board of Prince Edward County3 6 in-
volved the resistance of Prince Edward County officials to the
Supreme Court decision37 requiring integration of public schools.
83 The prosecution had agreed to such an arrangement both during the federal court
litigation and in the state court litigation ordered by this decision.
34 360 U.S. at 181.
86 Id. at 184.
36 377 US. 218 (1964).
37 Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
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The officials had dosed their public schools and the plaintiff sought
a declaratory judgment to require the schools to be kept open. The
defendants asked the federal court to abstain until the state courts
had decided whether the schools were required to be kept open under
Virginia law. The district court declined to abstain but the circuit
court reversed. On certiorari, the Supreme Court cursorily disposed
of the abstention doctrine in one paragraph of its opinion. The Court
stated: "in the first place the Supreme Court of Appeals of Virginia
has already passed on all the issues here.... But quite independent
of this we hold that the issues here imperatively call for decision
now."' 8 Thus, the doctrine was greatly debilitated by the Court's
holding that the need for a rapid decision was sufficient to overcome
the abstention doctrine, even where there was no threat of criminal
prosecution.
In Baggett v. Bullitt,9 the constitutionality of two Washington
loyalty oath statutes was challenged in a class action brought by
members of the faculty and student body of the University of Wash-
ington. Although the constitutionality of the statutes had not been
ruled on by the state court,40 the Supreme Court held abstention was
not an automatic rule applied whenever a federal court is faced with
a doubtful issue of state law; it rather involves a discretionary exer-
cise of a court's equity powers. Ascertainment of whether there exist
"the 'special circumstances' . . . prerequisite to its application must
be made on a case-by-case basis. . . . Those special circumstances
are not present here."41 In Baggett the Court emphasized the unde-
sirability of piecemeal adjudication if the federal court abstained
but it did not establish any clear standards for the lower federal
courts to apply in determining whether abstention was proper in
future cases.
In Dombrowski, the Court has set forth specific criteria which it
considers sufficient to overcome the abstention doctrine, at least in
a case where a criminal prosecution is threatened. The Court stated
that a federal district court must hear a case and decide it on the
38 377 U.S. at 229.
39 377 U.S. 360 (1964).
40 One statute had been challenged in the state courts earlier and the case had gone
to the United States Supreme Court, but was remanded and later dismissed on other
grounds. No threat of prosecution was imminent in this case; rather, the plaintiffs
contended they must either sign a vague oath or suffer the loss of their jobs. They
sought to invalidate the statutes before signing the oaths with the associated possible
perjury offense.
41 377 U.S. at 375.
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merits if a statute is attacked as unconstitutional either on its face
or as applied for the purpose of discouraging protected activities,
assuming that immediate irreparable injury is alleged and supported
by the facts. In addition, if a violation of the Civil Rights Act is
alleged, abstention is always inappropriate if the other elements of
irreparable injury and inadequate remedy at law are present.42 The
Court thus restored a federal remedy in two areas which had been
proscribed by Harrison, i.e., cases invoking the Civil Rights Act and
cases seeking to enjoin criminal proceedings where irreparable injury
to the plaintiff is present.43 In addition, the Court determined that
statutes are to be construed by federal courts as they exist when the
federal jurisdiction is invoked, not at some hypothetical future date
after a state court has construed the statute in a limited manner.
44
This approach is directly opposite to the underlying rationale of
abstention because it neither defers to the state courts nor does it
avoid an immediate decision of the constitutional issue by the federal
courts.
In determining the limits of Dombrowski, one must recognize that
an essential element was present: the danger of irreparable injury;
i.e., plaintiff's constitutionally protected rights were found to be
abridged by the threatened prosecutions. In addition, the statutes in
question were attacked on their face or as applied to the plaintiffs.
Although either one of the allegations would be sufficient to sup-
port the holding in Dombrowski, their presence does emphasize the
need for a clear violation of the plaintiff's constitutional rights.
A summary of the steps required by the Dombrowski decision
before a district court may enjoin a state criminal proceeding is as
follows: first, the court must establish jurisdiction to hear the case;
second, it must establish the presence of imminent irreparable injury;
third, it must determine that the allegations with respect to the
statutes are within the "on its face or as applied" rule of Dombrow-
ski; fourth, it must determine that the statute is in fact unconstitu-
tional. These steps replace a mechanical approach whereby the court
42 Specifically, the Court held, "if these allegations state a claim under the Civil
Rights Acts, . . . as we believe they do . . . the interpretation ultimately put on the
statutes by the state courts is irrelevant. For an interpretation rendering the statutes
inapplicable to SCEF would merely mean that appellants might ultimately prevail in
the state courts. It would not alter the impropriety of appellees invoking the statute in
bad faith to impose continuing harassment in order to discourage appellants' activities,
as appellees allegedly are doing and plan to continue to do." 380 U.S. at 490.
43 The dissenting opinion pointed out that the Dombrowski case was indistin-
guishable from Harrison and thus effectively overruled it. 380 U.S. at 501 n.3.
44 380 U.S. at 490.
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merely had to determine that unresolved state issues were present in
order to abstain in favor of state court adjudication. In cases where
the above tests are not met, abstention is still valid but the vitality
of the doctrine has been greatly diminished.45 Hopefully the appli-
cation of the new rules will result in substantial justice at a reason-
able cost in time and money and will tend to eliminate cases where
justice is delayed and consequently denied.
GERALD J. O'NEILL
45 See Davis v. Mann, 377 U.S. 678 (1964), Hostetter v. Idlewild Liquor Corp.,
377 U.S. 324 (1964); O'Brien, The Abstention Doctrine, 40 CAL. S.BJ. 487 (1965).
